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“Every disadvantage has its advantages”   -Johan Cruyff  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Every four years, the World Cup provides a visible reminder that 
football1 is the world’s game. European football clubs have capitalized on 
this popularity to generate billions of dollars from fans, media companies, 
and commercial advertisers.2 The emergence of football as a revenue 
generating enterprise has naturally led to an examination into who reaps the 
riches of football success.  
Successful clubs demonstrate a few main characteristics. Before 
considering these characteristics, it is important to note that football clubs 
have a unique position in European society. Clubs exist because a 
community of fans has associated themselves based on a love of football. 
Any successful club must try to incorporate fans because fans are the reason 
why the club exists and continues to exist. One of the most important 
aspects of a successful club is on the field success. For the top clubs, this 
usually means winning every competition the club competes in. For less 
successful clubs, this may mean finishing in a particular league position. 
Another characteristic is less visible than winning on the field of play. A 
successful club is one that lives within its financial means—a club that 
makes neither a profit nor a loss. A club with sizable yearly losses runs the 
risk of bankruptcy or seriously interfering with the integrity of the 
competition. A club that is too profitable risks complaints from fans 
regarding a lack of investment in the team. The challenge of successful 
managers is navigating these constraints. Club finances are not merely 
determined by on the field results, but are impacted by the ownership 
  
 . Johan Cruyff Football Quotes, EXPERTFOOTBALL.COM,  
http://expertfootball.com/gossip/quotes.php?search=Johan_Cruyff. Johan Cruyff is a Dutch 
football legend. He is considered one of the best five players to play the game. After his 
playing days ended, he turned to management and reestablished FC Barcelona as a force in 
football. 
 1. This paper will use the term football to describe the game that Americans know 
as soccer.    
 2. The 665 first division generated a record €11.7 billion in revenue in 2008/09. 
Jonathan Clegg, Soccer Clubs Warned Over Finances, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703791904576075982800093382.html. 
However, a great deal of this revenue was spent on player salaries. 64% of the club revenues 
were spent on salaries and 73 clubs spent more than 100% of their revenues on salaries. Id.  
The twenty richest clubs collectively generated revenues in excess of €4.3 billion during the 
2008/09 season. SPORTS BUSINESS GROUP, DELOITTE, FOOTBALL MONEY LEAGUE 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
UnitedKingdom/Local%20Assets/Documents/Industries/Sports%20Business%20Group/UK_
SBG_DFML2011.pdf.  
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structure of the club. Clubs controlled by fans may wish to spend money on 
tangible things like players, whereas clubs controlled by investors may wish 
to earn a return on their investment. The recent economic crisis has 
disrupted the delicate equilibrium that many clubs had previously 
maintained.  
In an effort to establish some guidelines for the proper governance of a 
club, UEFA3 has formulated a new set of regulations. Part I will examine 
these new regulations. Part II will look to the nature of the corporate 
structure of football clubs in Spain, in particular FC Barcelona and Real 
Madrid. Part III will analyze the various club structures allowed in Germany 
through the examples of Bayern Munich and BVB Borussia Dortmund. Part 
IV will address the nature of club ownership in England. This examination 
will include a look at clubs owned by a benefactor and clubs run as a normal 
business. Finally, Part V will attempt to decide which corporate form best 
promotes a sustainable and successful football club.4  
II. UEFA FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY RULES5 
The Financial Fair Play Rules owe their existence to Michel Platini, 
President of UEFA.6 Shortly after Platini took office in 2007, reform efforts 
took on greater significance due to the global recession. The recession has 
prompted a thorough reexamination of the financial conditions of clubs. 
Many clubs, including some of the leading clubs in Europe, faced and 
continue to face serious financial difficulties as a result of changes in the 
European business world.7 Platini decided that something must be done to 
encourage financial reform. Because of European Union regulations, UEFA 
is limited in the measures that it can take.8 Any measure must comply with 
the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. For instance, the Bosman decision 
prevents UEFA from controlling costs by imposing caps upon the number 
  
 3. FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) is the governing body of 
world football. UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) is the governing body of 
football in Europe. Each country has a federation or football association that governs the 
sport in the particular country. The United Kingdom is an anomaly in that it contains 
individual football associations for England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Despite 
unequal market size, each national association has equal voting power in UEFA. 
 4. As mentioned earlier, success can be defined both on the field and financially. 
This paper deals entirely with the financial definition of success with only brief mentions of 
on the field successes. 
 5. UEFA, UEFA CLUB LICENSING AND FINANCIAL FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS EDITION 
2010 (2010) [hereinafter UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS]. 
 6. Paolo Bandini, Platini Elected Uefa President, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2007/jan/26/newsstory.sport13.  
 7. See Leander Schaerlaeckens, Rolling Out of Control, SOCCERNET.COM (Sept. 22, 
2010), http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/5580467/european-football-eating-itself. 
The European clubs collectively lost €1.2 billion for the 2008/09 season. Clegg, supra note 2. 
 8. See Robert Siekmann, Is Sport ‘Special’ in EU Law and Policy?, in THE FUTURE 
OF SPORTS LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 37, 44–47 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2008). 
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of foreign, but European Union nationals in a team or preventing them from 
changing clubs after the player’s contract has expired.9  
Due to UEFA’s limitations, Platini formed an advisory group, the 
Professional Football Strategy Council, to examine what could be done to 
improve the financial regulation of the game.10 An American–style salary 
cap was considered, but ultimately discarded because of the difficulties in 
designing a system that complies with European Union law.11 Platini 
recognized that any regulation would have no chance of success if the most 
marketable clubs were opposed; therefore he also consulted with their 
representatives.12 Any reforms that UEFA may propose must abide by 
European Union labor and competition law.13 Although the European Union 
recognizes sports are a special case when considering competition law, it 
has not completely exempted sports leagues from European regulations.14 
As part of his efforts, Platini unsuccessfully petitioned the European Union 
Parliament to grant this sporting exemption from its competition law.15 
Ultimately, the Executive Committee of UEFA approved a plan called the 
  
 9. Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Ass’n ASBL v. 
Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I–4921.  
 10. Dominic Fifield, Platini Vows to Fight ‘Cheating’ English Clubs Over Debts, 
THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 7, 2008,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jun/07/premierleague.chelsea. 
 11. Kevin McCarra, Platini Sends Financing Warning to Europe’s Top Clubs, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 26, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jun/26/premierleague.europeanfootball; David 
Conn, Michel Platini’s Victory for Stability Spells End to Freewheeling Culture, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 26, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/may/26/michel-platini-uefa-club-finances. See 
also Thomas M. Schiera, Note, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow 
European Football to Reestablish the Completive Balance That It Helped Destroy?, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 709 (2007) (examining the legality of various methods to restrict player 
salaries); Christine Snyder, Note, Perfect Pitch: How U.S. Sports Financing and Recruiting 
Models Can Restore Harmony Between FIFA and the EU, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 499 
(2009) (examining why FIFA plans relating to player employment conflict with European 
Union Law). The most applicable provisions are contained in the competition provisions of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, specifically Article 101 (Article 81 TEC). See Schiera, supra note 11, 
at 731-32; Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Communities art. 101, Dec. 13, 2007, 2008 O. J. (C 115) 1.  
 12. Matt Scott, Platini Renews His Fight for European Salary Cap, THE GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), July 8, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2008/jul/08/2. 
 13. See Schiera, supra note 11.  
 14. Snyder, supra note 11, at 516–18. However, the EU Sports Commissioner has 
recently stated that the EU will investigate options such as caps on transfer fees. 
Commissioner Vassilieu: ‘I’m Shocked by Size of Football Transfer Fees, Euractive.com 
(Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.euractiv.com/en/sports/commissioner-vassiliou-im-shocked-
size-football-transfer-fees-interview-502414 [hereinafter Commissioner Vassilieu]. 
 15. Matt Scott & David Gow, Platini Calls on European Parliament to Make Sport a 
Special Case, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Feb. 18, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/feb/18/michel-platini-uefa-european-parliament. 
See also Snyder, supra note 13, at 516–18. 
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Financial Fair Play Rules with the support of wealthy owners.16 The 
European Union has recently stated that it approves of the rules laid out by 
UEFA.17 The Financial Fair Play rules have not yet taken effect, but Platini 
remains firm in his assertion that clubs will be excluded from the 
Champions League18 if they do not meet the requirements.19  
The Financial Fair Play Rules provide a basis for how a club should 
operate in order to obtain a license to compete in a UEFA competition20 like 
the Champions League. Although UEFA sets the standards for licensing, the 
actual licensing itself is every year done by the national association or the 
national league.21 The regulations require that the applicant be either a 
registered member of the association or have a contractual relationship with 
the registered member.22 However, any alterations within the past three 
years to the legal form of the club to evade the regulations and gain a 
license are forbidden.23 This would seem to be targeted toward preventing 
the creation of subsidiaries or other related companies solely to hold debt or 
to cover the club’s losses. The regulations take great care to inform 
applicants that the clubs have a continuing duty to provide any information 
required to make a decision concerning licensing.24 The Fair Play Rules are 
not just financial regulations, but include structural requirements for proper 
  
 16. Patrick Barclay, Michel Platini Finds Ally in Roman Abramovich as War on Debt 
Culture Intensifies, TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2009, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/sport/football/european_football/article6813001.ece; UEFA 
Approves Financial Fair Play Rules for European Clubs, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (May 27, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/27/uefa-michel-platini-club-financial-
regulations. 
 17. Developing the European Dimension in Sport, at 12, COM (2011) 12 final (Jan. 
18, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Commission Communication], available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/sport/news/doc/communication/communication_en.pdf. 
 18. The UEFA Champions League is an UEFA–wide competition run by UEFA. The 
Champions League includes the best clubs in Europe, including those that have not won their 
league the previous year. The competition takes place from September until May. Clubs play 
on Tuesdays and Wednesdays throughout the year. A number of clubs are given automatic 
places in the group stage, while other clubs must proceed through qualifying rounds. 
England, Spain, and Italy each have 3 guaranteed places in the group stage and 1 place in the 
final qualifying round. Germany has 2 automatic places and 1 qualifying place. The 32 team 
group stage contains eight groups of 4 teams. Each team in the group plays the other teams 
home and away. The top two teams in each group advance to the knockout rounds. The 
teams are drawn in a playoff system with the winner after the home and away legs advancing 
to the next round. The final is a single game played in May on a neutral field.  
 19. David Conn, Michel Platini Will Expel Debt-Laden Clubs from the Champions 
League, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/aug/26/michel-platini-champions-league. 
 20. UEFA competitions include the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA 
Europa League. 
 21. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 5. The license can be 
withdrawn if the club becomes bankrupt or is liquidated. Id. art. 14. 
 22. Id. art. 12. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. art. 13. 
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operations. Among the requirements are a youth development program, 
player registration, training facilities, a general manager, a financial officer, 
a media officer, a supporter liaison officer, a head coach, and assistants.25 
The organizational requirements are not very onerous for clubs that 
compete in European competitions because most clubs have required 
infrastructure in place. The challenge for clubs is to fulfill the break–even 
requirement.26 UEFA determines that a club has broken even for the year 
when the relevant expenses exceed the relevant income by less than €5 
million for the prior year.27 UEFA permits small losses because on the field 
upsets and disappointments are expected in an unpredictable business like 
sports. UEFA recognized that many large clubs could not currently pass the 
break even requirement, thus the amount of any acceptable deviation will 
gradually decrease to the €5 million goal. A loss of €45 million for the 
2013/14 and 2014/15 monitoring periods is acceptable, but this threshold is 
then lowered to €30 million for the following two periods.28 Although the 
losses are permitted, UEFA requires that these losses be covered by 
contributions from an equity holder.29 This ensures that creditors, especially 
other football clubs, will be paid. Although short term financial results may 
be acceptable, the applicant must demonstrate the future ability of the club 
to continue as a going concern.30 Required documentation includes 
information about the club, the club’s subsidiaries,31 and controlling 
parties.32 UEFA has stated that a club that has a wage to revenue ratio 
greater than 70% or a net debt greater than 100% of revenue will be closely 
scrutinized.33 Because the owners of many of the clubs have sufficient 
resources to evade these simple requirements, UEFA has set out a list of 
relevant income and expenses and required that they be valued at their fair 
market value in an arm’s length transaction.34 
Although many of Fair Play provisions are already in place, this is the 
first time that UEFA has managed to impose some strict standards of 
corporate governance on its member clubs. With the state of the economy, 
  
 25. Id. arts. 17–18, 20, 25, 28–30, 35, 36–39. 
 26. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 57.  
 27. Id. art. 61. Platini noted at a press conference in January 2011 that 11 clubs 
would potentially have been excluded from the 2010/11 Champions League and the 2010/11 
Europa League. Clegg, supra note 2. Platini also noted that despite the €11.7 billion in 
revenue, the top division clubs collectively lost €1.2 billion. Id. 
 28. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 61. The 2013/14 monitoring 
period begins with the 2011/12 season. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. art. 52. 
 31. Many clubs own their own stadium or have other commercial interests related to 
the professional team. Separating these from the professional team has benefits in regard to 
limiting liability.  
 32. UEFA FAIR PLAY REGULATIONS, supra note 5, art. 46. 
 33. Id. art. 62. 
 34. Id. art. 58. 
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football clubs can only benefit from moving towards a sustainable financial 
model. Although firm rules are in place, it remains to be seen if UEFA will 
actually exclude high profile clubs that fail to meet the break even 
requirement or bow to sponsorship and political pressure. 
III. SPANISH SOCIO MODEL 
The Spanish governance model adopted by FC Barcelona (“Barcelona”) 
and Real Madrid CF (“Real Madrid”) is a model that has remained 
relatively unchanged in the century since the foundation of both clubs. Fans 
who pay a modest fee are given the opportunity to exercise some measure of 
control over club governance. Even among Spanish clubs, this fan-
controlled structure is anomaly. This model has been named the “socio” 
model after the Spanish word for fan. 
A. FC Barcelona 
Futbol Club Barcelona is one of the most famous clubs in the world. 
Barcelona has transformed itself into a global brand through television 
exposure and summer tours of North America and Asia. The result of these 
efforts is shown in the five million Barcelona jerseys that have been sold in 
the last five years. 35 Barcelona was founded by Swiss, British, and Spanish 
players in 1899.36 From humble beginnings, Joan Gamper provided the 
driving force that led to a club with 12,000 members after only 25 years.37 
From the 1920s until Franco’s death in 1975, the Spanish government 
attempted to extinguish Catalan culture.38 Only at Barcelona games were 
Catalans allowed to publicly speak in Catalan.39 As a result, Barcelona 
became inextricably identified as a symbol of the region of Catalunya.40 
The organization of the club gives the fans considerable influence. In 
keeping with the club’s original theme, the governing power resides in its 
  
 35. Alex Miller, Exclusive: Manchester United Lead in Global Shirt Sales; Liverpool 
in Chasing Pack, SPORTINGINTELLIGENCE.COM (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.sportingintelligence.com/2010/08/31/revealed-the-worlds-best-selling-club-
football-shirts-310802/. 
 36. JIMMY BURNS, BARÇA: A PEOPLE’S PASSION 76–77 (rev. ed. 2009). 
 37. Id. at 82. 
 38. FRANKLIN FOER, HOW SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD 200–04 (rev. ed 2006). 
 39. Id. at 195, 204–05. 
 40. Despite Franco’s disfavor, the club did manage to build Camp Nou, its 99,000 
seat stadium, and win numerous trophies during the Franco era. BURNS, supra note 36, at 41, 
172. Barcelona fans adamantly believe that Franco influenced the transfer of Alfredo 
DiStefano to Real Madrid instead of Barcelona. DiStefano was an Argentinean that sought to 
play in Spain during the 1950s. Barcelona had extensive negotiations with DiStefano before 
the Spanish Federation imposed a ban on the signing of foreign players. As a result of the 
ban, the Federation told Barcelona and Madrid that they would be forced to share the player. 
Eventually, Barcelona agreed to give up its claim on the player. Id. at 158–59. 
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members. 41 Barcelona currently has over 170,000 socios42 as a result of a 
worldwide campaign to generate revenue and loyalty to the club. Despite 
the global reach of Barcelona, non-Spanish members constitute less than 
20% of the socios.43 The requirements to become a member and maintain 
membership are simply the payment of a relatively modest annual fee as 
well as good behavior by the member.44 Every socio is subject to regulation 
of the five person disciplinary commission, which can remove a member for 
failure to pay dues or a violation of club behavioral regulations.45 Because 
the typical socio is distant from the governing of the club, a member’s 
trustee serves as an independent advisor and defender of the socio’s rights.46 
Club membership entitles the fan to privileges like a bimonthly magazine 
and a monthly email as well as the right to vote.47 The socio may vote to 
elect the President and the Board of Directors that manage the day to day 
operations of the club.48 The socio may also occasionally be called upon to 
vote on extraordinary issues affecting the club.49  
  
 41. Sean Hamil, Geoff Walters, Lee Watson, The Model of Governance at FC 
Barcelona: Balancing Member Democracy, Commercial Strategy, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Sporting Performance, 11 SOCCER & SOC. 475, 496 (2010).   
 42. Alex Duff, Barcelona Soccer Club Members Vote to Sue Laporta After Loss, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-10-16/barcelona-
soccer-club-members-vote-to-sue-laporta-after-loss.html. 
 43. FC BARCELONA, MEMORIA 2008–2009, at 91 (2009). 
 44. FC BARCELONA, FC BARCELONA STATUTES 12–13 (2009) [hereinafter 
BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES], 
http://www.fcbarcelona.com/web/downloads/sala_premsa/estatuts/ESTATUS_ANGLES_20
09_COMPLETS_baixa.pdf. Barcelona has recently controversially closed membership to the 
general public, limiting membership to former members and members who have a family 
member who is a member. Members Zone, Advantages, Information and Special Offers, FC 
BARCELONA, http://www.fcbarcelona.cat/web/english/socis/fes-te_soci/nova/info_senior.html 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2010).The cost to join the club is currently €161.50. Id. 
 45. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 12–13, 58, 66–69. 
 46. Id. at 55–57. The member’s trustee must be a member of the club and serves a 5 
year term. The selection by the Board of Directors is ratified by the Assembly of Delegates. 
Id. at 56. 
 47. Members Zone, Advantages, Information and Special Offers, FC BARCELONA, 
http://www.fcbarcelona.cat/web/english/socis/avantatges/viu.html (last visited Nov. 13, 
2010). 
 48. Hamil, supra note 41, at 496. As with US citizens, the right to vote does not 
necessarily mean that a member will exercise it. The record turnout for a Barcelona election 
is only 54.7%. Id. at 482. 
 49. Id. at 486. An example of an extraordinary issue is the vote on shirt sponsorship. 
Barcelona traditionally has never had a shirt sponsor. In 2005, the members approved a 
proposal to allow shirt sponsorship. Although the board favored passage in order to increase 
revenue for playing operations, Barcelona later decided to place UNICEF on its shirt at no 
cost to UNICEF. A number of the members were not pleased about this loss of potential 
revenue. Id. at 493. Barcelona has recently announced that it will be sponsored by the Qatar 
foundation for 5 seasons, commencing at the start of the 2011/12 season. The Qatar 
foundation will pay the club €30 million per year. Paolo Bandini, Barcelona Are More Than 
Just a Club. They Are a Business, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Dec. 10, 2010), 
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A club with significant business interests like Barcelona cannot feasibly 
be directly governed by votes of its thousands of members.50 In order to 
create a structure that is better suited to govern, Barcelona has an Assembly 
of Delegates. The Assembly of Delegates consists of three thousand 
members serving two year terms.51 The vast majority of Delegates are club 
members chosen at random, but board members, former presidents, 
members of the disciplinary and economic commissions, and up to twenty 
five members chosen by the board are also included.52 The Assembly is 
tasked with general supervisory functions like approving the club’s budget 
and annual report.53 The Assembly is also given the power to censure the 
Board and the President as well as to appoint the members of the economic 
commission, which advises the Board of financial matters involving the 
club.54   
An effectively run business must have a small core of individuals 
running the day to day business. At Barcelona, this role is fulfilled by the 
Board of Directors and the President. The President and Board of Directors 
are elected on a single electoral slate for six year terms.55 The Board is 
given the function of managing club operations while the President oversees 
the club.56 The Board does not have a fixed membership and can vary 
between fourteen to twenty one members depending upon how the President 
and Board wish to divide responsibilities.57 The club has wisely chosen to 
set up a series of checks on the power of the President and the Board. The 
President is not permitted to serve more than two terms as president.58 
Because the President and Directors are jointly liable for any financial 
damage to the club resulting from malfeasance, the President and every 
Director must provide a €1.5 million guarantee to the club as part of the 
election process.59 The President and Board are not only subject to regular 
  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/dec/10/barcelona-record-sponsor-qatar-
foundation. 
 50. There is a club that is directly governed by its supporters. Ebbsfleet United is 
owned by myfootballclub, an online venture. myfootballclub allows its members to vote 
directly on club policies, but not to pick who plays on the field. David Conn, AFC 
Wimbledon and Ebbsfleet Have Different Reasons for FA Cup Hope, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), 
Nov. 5, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/nov/05/afc-wimbledon-
ebbsfleet-united-fa-cup. 
 51. Hamil, supra note 41, at 480; BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 18. 
 52. Hamil, supra note 41, at 480. 
 53. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 15–17. 
 54. See Hamil, supra note 41, at 480; BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 
57. 
 55. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 27, 43–44. 
 56. Hamil, supra note 41, at 483. 
 57. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 24. 
 58. Hamil, supra note 41, at 483. A board member is allowed to serve an unlimited 
number of terms. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 27. 
 59. Hamil, supra note 41, at 483; BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 32–
33. Spanish sports law provides that a board of directors must provide a guarantee of 15% of 
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elections, but also to no confidence votes if 5% of the voting members are 
not satisfied with the club’s governance.60  
As with transitions in national governments, presidential succession at 
Barcelona can be a difficult time for the club. In the summer of 2010, 
Sandro Rosell was elected president to replace the outgoing Joan Laporta.61 
Rosell and Laporta were once allies, but a dispute arose in 2005 that 
prompted Rosell’s resignation from his vice presidency.62 Predictably, this 
tension continued after Rosell came to power. Laporta had previously 
reported that Barcelona had made a €11 million profit for 2009–2010.63 
Rosell instituted a Deloitte & Touche audit that uncovered a loss of €79.60 
million.64 Rosell also stated that Barcelona had €392 million in debt at the 
end of the 2009–10 season.65 This debt promoted Barcelona to take out a 
£130 million loan to meet short term commitments.66 Rosell proposed 
personally suing Laporta for €48.7 million on the basis of financial 
mismanagement of the club.67 The member assembly voted narrowly in 
favor of the suit.68 
  
the club’s budget for the year. Spanish Sports Act 7th Additional Protocol (B.O.E. 1990, 10), 
available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1990/10/17/pdfs/A30397-30411.pdf. The guarantee 
is enforceable by La Liga, the Spanish professional league. Id. Any action for damages may 
be initiated by the Assembly by a majority vote of those present within four months of the 
end of the fiscal year. Id. Spanish law also provides for the 15% guarantee to be reduced by 
any profits accumulated by the club. Royal Decree on Sports Corporations 2d Additional 
Protocol (B.O.E. 1999, 1251), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1999/07/17/pdfs/A27070-27080.pdf.. 
 60. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 51–52. However, removal 
requires a two third majority of the votes cast. Id. at 54. 
 61. Barcelona’s New President Says Club Will Not End Cesc Fabregas Pursuit, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jun/14/barcelona-cesc-fabregas-arsenal. 
 62. Sid Lowe, Execs, Lies, and Videotape, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Oct. 25, 2005), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2005/oct/24/europeanfootball.sport2. 
 63. Sid Lowe, End of an Expensive Era, But Barcelona’s Players Prove Priceless, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/oct/18/barcelona-end-of-expensive-era. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Matt Scott, With Their Worrying Balance Sheet, Can Barcelona Afford Cesc 
Fabregas?, THE GUARDIAN (U.K), July 14, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/14/barcelona-debt-finance-fabregas. Rosell’s 
rhetoric was a bit alarmist and probably overstated for political purposes. The presence of a 
large amount of short term debt does not necessarily mean that the club is in poor financial 
shape. How Can Barcelona Afford Cesc Fabregas?, SWISS RAMBLE, 
http://swissramble.blogspot.com/2010/05/how-can-barcelona-afford-cesc-fabregas.html (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 66. Barcelona Take Out £130m Santander and La Caixa Loan to Pay Wages, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (July 14, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jul/14/barcelona-
loan-santander-la-caixa. 
 67. Lowe, End of an Expensive Era, supra note 63. 
 68. Id. Interesting enough, Rosell himself abstained from voting. Id. As the legal 
process is not yet complete, Laporta has not yet been forced to relinquish his guarantee. 
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Barcelona is probably the most famous example of the fan–owned club 
in the world. Barcelona has exploited this unique situation in positioning 
itself as a club of the people. In conjunction with the club’s attractive style 
of play,69 the club’s democratic structure is very appealing to potential fans 
outside of Spain. The club’s structure also has economic advantages. The 
members provide a substantial amount of financial support to the club 
through their member dues.70 Additionally, the widespread membership 
forces the Barcelona leadership to look beyond their parochial interests. 
Despite the club’s significant fan involvement, there are substantial 
drawbacks to the Barcelona model. Because Barcelona is committed to 
ownership by its fans, its legal structure does not permit equity to be sold in 
the club. If the club confronts a future cash crisis, the club is limited in the 
ways that it can raise cash. This problem is tempered by the fact that 
Spanish banks have been extremely willing to lend money to other football 
clubs, as well as Barcelona itself.71 A bank that is a creditor of Barcelona 
would be extremely unwilling to be seen as the bank that forced the 
dissolution of the club. Along with the weaknesses in the share structure, 
the populist leadership of the club can be seen as a negative. As with any 
democratic election, there is the danger of politics and nasty campaigning. 
Furthermore, the Catalan character of the club makes the club a tool for 
political gain in Catalunya, as demonstrated by Laporta’s campaign for the 
Parliament of Catalunya.72 These aspects can distract from the underlying 
purpose of the club as a sporting entity. Additionally, the elective structure 
allows for the leadership of the club to change rather suddenly. Barcelona 
appears to have had rather good luck with its leaders, but it is certainly 
possible that an ill–advised choice of president could create significant 
financial difficulties. Barcelona’s club structure allows for fan input but 
lacks the continuity in leadership that a corporation can offer. 
B. Real Madrid 
Real Madrid is a probably the most famous club in the world. Through 
adept marketing of its superstars, Real Madrid has sold over 6 million 
jerseys over the past six years and has topped the Deloitte Money List as the 
  
 69. Barcelona utilizes a ball possession style of play that emphasizes the use of many 
short passes. This results in a many scoring opportunities, but also has the advantage of 
denying scoring chances to the opponent. The December 2010 5–0 victory over Real Madrid 
is a great example of Barcelona’s style. See, e.g., Brian Phillips, All Hail Barcelona, 
SLATE.COM (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/2278915/. 
 70. Duff, supra note 42. 
 71. BURNS, supra note 36, at 349. 
 72. Giles Tremlett, Barcelona’s Former Chairman Joan Laporta Adds Sex to 
Catalan Separatism, GUARDIAN.CO.UK. (Nov. 14, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/14/barcelona-joan-laporta-catalan-separatism. 
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richest club in the world.73 However, Real Madrid did not become world–
famous overnight. Real Madrid was founded as Madrid Futbol Club on 
March 6, 1902.74 At the outset of the club, the governing structure was very 
important as evidenced by the fact that the club’s board of directors was 
elected even before the formal paperwork was filed. 75 By 1912, the club 
had 450 members and the members were able to build a stadium.76 In 1920, 
the club had received sufficient prominence to receive the “real” 
designation from King Alfonso XIII.77 During Franco’s dictatorship, Real 
Madrid became a public relations device both internationally and 
domestically because of its location in the capital of Spain.78 Real Madrid’s 
fame results not only from its marketing success but also its nine European 
Cups, including the first five cups staged.79   
The club is organized in a similar manner to Barcelona. Members of Real 
Madrid vote for the President and Board of Directors of the club.80 As of the 
2009 annual report, Real Madrid has 93,587 members that paid €143 per 
year for member privileges.81 These members not only had to pay the 
required yearly fee, but also gain the recommendation of two current socios 
in order to join the club.82 These privileges include not only the right to 
vote, but also priority in the purchasing of tickets.83 Like Barcelona, Real 
Madrid socios are also subject to discipline if the socios fail to pay dues or 
conduct themselves in an appropriate manner.84  
As decisions can be better considered by a relatively small body, the 
members are represented at the Member Assembly. Unlike Barcelona’s 
decision to randomly select delegates to its member assembly, Real Madrid 
has chosen to elect its 1,992 ordinary members for 4 year terms.85  Because 
of the interest in the election by socios, the club has required that the voting 
  
 73. Miller, supra note 35; DELOITTE, supra note 2, at 2. 
 74. PHIL BALL, WHITE STORM: 101 YEARS OF REAL MADRID 50 (rev. ed. 2003). 
Ironically, the meeting took place in a store owned by Catalans. Id. at 45–46. 
 75. Id. at 50–51. On March 9, the club’s first game was played after the members’ 
dues were collected. The monthly dues were 2 pesetas. Id. 
 76. Id. at 52. 
 77. Id. at 53. The real designation is a mark of royal patronage and permits the club 
to include a crown in its seal. 
 78. Id. at 109. 
 79. Football’s Premier Club Competition, UEFA.COM (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/history/index.html. The Champions League 
replaced the European Cup in 1992. Id. 
 80. REAL MADRID C.F., ESTATUTOS SOCIALES 11-12 (2009) [hereinafter REAL 
MADRID CLUB STATUTES], 
http://www.realmadrid.com/StaticFiles/RealMadrid/img/pdf/LibroEstatutosSociales.pdf. 
 81. REAL MADRID C.F. GENERAL REPORT 2008–2009, at 33 (2009) [hereinafter REAL 
MADRID 2009 REPORT]. 
 82. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 80, at 7. 
 83. REAL MADRID 2009 REPORT, supra note 81, at 33. 
 84. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 80, at 9–10. 
 85. REAL MADRID 2009 REPORT, supra note 81, at 32. 
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for delegates take place in person.86 Like Barcelona, the Member Assembly 
also includes a number of extraordinary members, including the 13 
members of the Board of Directors, the President, and former club 
presidents.87 The Member Assembly is tasked with regular annual matters 
like approving the budget as well as extraordinary measures like 
disciplining the President and authorizing the club to borrow money.88 
The socios elect the President as the head of an electoral slate that 
includes the President and the Board of Directors.89 At the time of the 
election, the President must be Spanish and a member of the club for ten or 
more consecutive years.90 When standing for the 4 year term, the candidates 
for President must provide a substantial bank guarantee.91 In 2009, the 
socios of Real Madrid elected Florentino Perez to serve as president.92 This 
is currently Perez’s second stint as president. His first stint lasted from 2000 
until his resignation in 2006.93 The latter half of his term was characterized 
by on the field disappointment. Perez had lured a number of stars from other 
clubs at great cost in order to create a team of superstars.94 Since the 
Champions League victory in 2003, Real Madrid has failed to advance from 
the first knockout round of the Champions League every year.95  Despite the 
  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 80, at 16–17. 
 89. REAL MADRID C.F. ELECCIONES A PRESIDENTE Y JUNTA DIRECTIVA–12/06/2009, 
at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.realmadrid.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf
&blobheadername1=Content-
disposition&blobheadervalue1=attachment%3B+filename%3DNORMASELECTORALES.pd
f&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1202886663591&ssbinary=true. The 
number of members of the Board may vary from five to twenty. REAL MADRID CLUB 
STATUTES, supra note 80, at 18. 
 90. REAL MADRID CLUB STATUTES, supra note 81, at 19. 
 91. Id. For the 2009 race, the guarantee amounted to €57 million. Election Rules, 
REAL MADRID C.F., 
http://www.realmadrid.com/cs/Satellite/en/1202772523299/noticia/Noticia/Election_rules.ht
m (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). At Barcelona, the guarantee does not have to be formalized 
until just before the Board assumes office. BARCELONA CLUB STATUTES, supra note 44, at 51. 
 92. Organogram, REAL MADRID C.F., 
http://www.realmadrid.com/cs/Satellite/en/Club/1193041516782/EstructuraOrganizativa/Org
anogram.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). 
 93. Sid Lowe, Lock Up Your Glacticos-Florentino Perez Is Poised to Return to Real 
Madrid, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 13, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2009/may/13/real-madrid-florentino-perez-election. 
 94. Perez paid €440 million in three years for stars like  Luis Figo, Zinedine Zidane, 
Ronaldo, and David Beckham. Id. The Portuguese midfielder Luis Figo was acquired from 
Barcelona in 2000. The French midfield Zidane arrived from the Italian club Juventus in 
2001. The Brazilian striker Ronaldo came from Inter Milan in 2002. The English midfielder 
David Beckham arrived from Manchester United in 2003. 
 95. Sid Lowe, Lyon Send Cristiano Ronaldo’s Real Madrid Packing, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Mar. 10, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/mar/10/real-
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disappointing on the field results, the Galacticos project96 was a tremendous 
commercial success, propelling Real Madrid into the title of the world’s 
richest club.97 When Perez was elected again in 2009, he instituted a similar 
project. The club took out a €152 million loan to finance purchases in the 
summer of 2009.98 The club surpassed the world record transfer fee99 twice 
in the span of a few weeks. The Brazilian forward Kaka was signed for 
€68.5 million from AC Milan before the Portuguese forward Cristiano 
Ronaldo was signed for €93.5 million from Manchester United.100 Despite 
the substantial outlay, the club still failed to advance to the second knockout 
round of the Champions League or win the Spanish League title. During the 
summer of 2010, Perez wisely decided to refrain from wild spending on 
players and hired the accomplished manager Jose Mourinho.101 
The club structure of Real Madrid has a number of similar characteristics 
to the Barcelona structure, especially in regard to fan engagement. 
Additionally, because of the wealth requirements to gain elective office, the 
club is usually run by competent businessmen. These businessmen have 
managed the Real Madrid brand quite well. The commercial success has led 
to Real Madrid’s placement at the top of the Deloitte Football Money 
League. However, the same businessmen who have shown such great 
judgment in building their fortunes often have abandoned good sense for on 
the field matters. Money is often spent on star offensive players that the 
manager does not necessarily want and that unbalance the team. The 
pressure that the fans and the President place on the team can be 
suffocating, thus resulting in a high turnover rate of its managers. The club 
has changed managers about every year since the last Champions League 
trophy. This impatience has a severely negative impact upon developing the 
  
madrid-lyon-champions-league1. As of the completion of this paper, Real Madrid was tied 1-
1 going into the second leg of the first knockout round of the 2010/11 Champions League. 
 96. In English, galacticos means star. Real Madrid gained this derisory designation 
because it had acquired a number of world stars based on marketing potential and apparently 
without regard as to how so many offensive players could play together. 
 97. DELOITTE, supra note 2, at 9. 
 98. See Sid Lowe, Revealed: The Loans Real Madrid Took Out After Kaka and 
Ronaldo Deals, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/jun/16/real-madrid-loans-debt. 
 99. Unlike in American sports, neither free agency nor trading players is very 
common. Players usually change clubs when a second club pays a transfer fee to the first 
club for the registration rights of the player. Cristiano Ronaldo’s transfer was the most paid 
by any club for a single transfer. 
 100. Manchester United’s Cristiano Ronaldo Seals Six-Year Deal with Real Madrid, 
GUARDIAN.CO.UK (June 26, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/jun/26/cristiano-
ronaldo-manchester-united-real-madrid.  As of January 1, 2010, Ronaldo has been a huge on 
the field success while Kaka has struggled with poor form and injury. 
 101. Sid Lowe, Jose Mourinho Represents Real Madrid’s Last Throw of the Dice, 
THE OBSERVER (U.K), Aug. 29, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/aug/29/jose-mourinho-real-madrid. Mourinho 
managed the most recent Champions League winner, Inter Milan. Id.  
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product on the field for the medium term. Perez has apparently resolved this 
problem by appointing Mourinho as manager, but it remains to be seen 
whether the socios will turn on Mourinho if Real Madrid do not win this 
year. The short term thinking brought on by officials with relatively short 
terms can damage the club in the long term. 
C.  S.A.D.s 
At their founding, Real Madrid and Barcelona were not alone in having a 
socio club structure. Virtually every club in Spain was formed in a similar 
way. However, the limited success of the other clubs limited the financial 
performance of the clubs and the clubs lived beyond their financial means. 
In 1990, the Spanish government required all clubs to form themselves into 
a Sociedades Anonimas Deportiva (S.A.D.).102 The clubs’ debts were 
canceled and shares were given to the individual members.103 Gradually, the 
shares were collected by wealthy supporters and the poor financial 
performance continued.104 As of March 2010, the overall debt in the Spanish 
league is estimated at €3.5 billion.105 The third most successful club over the 
past five years, Valencia C.F. owes €600 million.106 Despite the best 
intentions of the Spanish government, the required reorganization has done 
nothing except transfer control from the club’s fans to a few wealthy 
individuals. The lesson of Spain shows that one type of club structure is not 
preferable to the other if the same bad management remains in charge. 
IV. GERMAN MODEL 
The Bundesliga, Germany’s top professional division, has the unique 
distinction of being the only major European football league where its teams 
collectively make a profit.107 The Bundesliga also has the highest average 
attendance of the five major European leagues in part because of its fan-
  
 102. Spanish Sports Act 9th Additional Protocol (B.O.E. 1990, 10), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1990/10/17/pdfs/A30397-30411.pdf.. See also Hamil, supra note 
39, at 479.  Only FC Barcelona, Real Madrid, Athletic Bilbao, and Osasuna were excepted 
from this requirement because they had recorded a positive account balance during the 
1985/86 season. Id. at 480. The Societas Anonimas is the equivalent of the UK limited 
company and the US corporation. Javier Aroyo, Spain, in EUROPEAN COMPANY STRUCTURES 
215, 216 (Michael J. Oltmanns ed., 1998). 
 103. Hamil, supra note 41, at 479. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Sid Lowe, Domination of Barcelona and Real Madrid Making Spain the New 
Scotland, THE OBSERVER (U.K), Mar. 20, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/mar/28/barcelona-real-madrid-spain. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Jamie Jackson, How the Bundesliga Puts the Premier League to Shame, THE 
OBSERVER (U.K.), Apr. 11, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/apr/11/bundesliga-premier-league. 
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friendly measures of low ticket prices and direct fan involvement in club 
affairs. 108 This financial strength may have come at the cost of success in 
the Champions League, as no Bundesliga team has won the Champions 
League since 2001.109 The governing body of German Football, the 
Deutsher Fußball–Bund, has made certain provisions for governance that 
has helped lead to such great financial strength. In 1998, the Bundesliga 
permitted its member clubs to adopt a few different club structures as long 
as the club controls the new structure (known as the 50+1 Rule).110 These 
provisions allow for a number of unique options in structuring a club. 
A. The Traditional Structure (e.V.) 
Until the late 1990s, the typical Bundesliga club was organized as an 
eingetrager verein (e.V.).111 The e.V. has legal personhood and provides for 
restricted legal liability for its members.112 The e.V. has a limited set of 
requirements that includes at least seven members, a board, and a charter.113 
The e.V. is attractive to a more informal grouping of individuals because it 
has no capital requirements, no accounts publication requirements, and no 
fixed organizational structure other than the requirement of a board.114 
Another advantageous feature of German corporate law allows for an e.V. 
to own profit–seeking enterprises.115 As a football club structure, the e.V. 
provides a strong voice for the member–fans who ultimately control the 
club. However, many larger German clubs have moved away from this 
structure for a variety of reasons. Although the fan input is important, the 
club management can be distracted by petty issues like parent complaints 
about their children’s playing time. These minor disputes can paralyze or 
fracture the management of the club. The minimal central control makes it 
difficult to make long–term decisions necessary for the large professional 
club and poses an obstacle when attempting to exploit important 
commercial revenue streams. 
  
 108. Id. La Liga attracted an average of 28,478 fans, Ligue 1 (France) 21,034, Serie A 
(Italy) 25,304 and the Premier League 35,592. These figures are dwarfed by the Bundesliga’s 
average of 41,904. Id. 
 109. Id. In this period of time, only Spanish (3), Italian (3), English (2), and 
Portuguese teams have won Champions League titles. However, German teams have made 
two losing appearances in the final.  
 110. Uwe Wilkesmann & Doris Blutner, Going Public: The Organizational 
Restructuring of German Football Clubs, 3 SOCCER & SOC. 19, 27 (2002).  
 111. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, as amended, 
§§ 21, 65 (Ger.), available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bgb/index.html, translated at 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/englisch_bgb/index.html. 
 112. Id. §§ 31, 31a.  
 113. Id. §§ 25, 26, 56, 57. 
 114. Annette Zimmer, et al., The Legacy of Subsidiarity: The Nonprofit Sector in 
Germany, in FUTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: MAKING CENTRAL EUROPEAN NONPROFIT-
ORGANISATIONS WORK 681, 691 (Eckhard Priller & Annettee Zimmer eds., 2004). 
 115. BGB § 22.  
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B. AGs 
A number of clubs have moved to the Aktiengesellschaft (AG) structure, 
including Bayern Munich, Germany’s most successful club.116 The AG is 
the German equivalent of the public limited company or American 
corporation.117 An AG is characterized by a dual board structure.118 The 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is elected at the shareholders’ general 
meeting.119 The Aufsichtsrat is charged with appointing, consulting and 
supervising the managing board (Vorstand).120 A member of the 
Aufsichtsrat is forbidden from membership on the Vorstand in order to 
eliminate conflicts of interest.121 German law also limits the terms of 
members of the Aufsichtsrat to five years to ensure that the stockholders 
have the opportunity to choose whether to continue with the management 
composition.122 The Vorstand is charged with running the operations of the 
AG.  German law does not provide a limit to the number of members of the 
Vorstand, but does provide that the term of a member may not exceed five 
years without reappointment.123 In AGs with a wide range of business 
interests, each member of the multi–person Vorstand may be given different 
responsibilities.124 The members on the Vorstand act jointly for liability 
purposes and thus all members of the Vorstand must agree on an action 
unless the articles of incorporation provide otherwise.125 Because of its 
popularity in German business, German law provides a very defined 
corporate structure for organizations that adopt the AG model.      
Bayern Munich serves as a good model for demonstrating the AG 
structure in football. As Bundesliga rules prevent the club from constituting 
itself as an AG owned entirely by individual shareholders, Bayern Munich’s 
  
 116. ULRICH HESSE-LICHTENBERGER, TOR!: THE STORY OF GERMAN FOOTBALL 161 
(rev. ed. 2003). 
 117. Joachim Drude & Michael Oltmanns, Germany, in EUROPEAN COMPANY 
STRUCTURES, supra note 100, at 94. 
 118. Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative 
Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 555, 561 
(2000). 
 119. Aktiengesetz [AktG] [Stock Corporation Act], Sept. 6, 1965, BGBl I at 1089, last 
amended by Gesetz [G], Aug. 24, 2004, BGBl. I at 2198, § 101 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/aktg/gesamt.pdf. See also Drude & Oltmanns, 
supra note 117, at 106.  
 120. AktG § 111. In certain types of corporations, there is a requirement that a certain 
portion of the supervisory board must be comprised of representatives of the workers. See 
Butler, supra note 118, at 562–63. 
 121. AktG § 105. See also Butler, supra note 118, at 563. 
 122. AktG § 102. See also Butler, supra note 118, at 564. 
 123. AktG §§ 102, 84. See also Butler, supra note 118, at 566. 76 AktG provides that 
if an AG has capital of more than 3 million Euros, the Vorstand must have at least two 
members. Id.  
 124. Butler, supra note 118, at 566.  
 125. AktG § 77. See also Butler, supra note 118, at 567–68. 
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130,000 members pay an annual fee of €50 to belong to Bayern Munich 
e.V. 126  The members elect their president–currently Uli Hoeneß–and two 
vice presidents. 127 By virtue of its 87.4% stake in Bayern Munich AG, 
which owns the professional part of the club, the e.V. complies with the 
Bundesliga’s 50+1 control requirement. 128 The remaining stake in the AG is 
owned by Adidas and Audi. 129 As required by law, Bayern Munich AG is 
governed by an Aufsichtsrat and a Vorstand. Bayern Munich AG’s articles 
of incorporation provide for a nine member Aufsichtsrat.130 Significant 
members of the Aufsichtsrat include Hoeneß, the chairman of Audi, and the 
CEO of Adidas.131 This ensures that the most powerful shareholders can 
exercise some measure of control over the company. Bayern Munich AG is 
ultimately run by the four member Vorstand, chaired by Karl–Heinz 
Rummenigge, a former Bayern Munich player. 132    
Bayern Munich is an exceptionally well–run club from a financial 
perspective. The club has made a profit for seventeen straight years.133 In 
the latest Deloitte Football Money League, Bayern had the fourth highest 
turnover at €323.0 million.134 Bayern Munich has managed to achieve this 
financial prosperity in a balanced manner. Bayern Munich owns its own 
stadium, the Allianz Arena, which generates 21% of the club’s revenue 
while keeping ticket prices affordable for fans.135 Bayern Munich’s 
commercial sponsorships bring in a football record €172.9 million, which 
constitutes 553 of the club’s revenue.136 Most remarkable is that Bayern has 
managed to pay only 48% of its turnover on wages while still remaining 
incredibly effective on the field.137 
  
 126. Membership, FC BAYERN MUNICH, http://www.fcbayern.t-
com.de/en/company/club/membership/index.php?fcb_sid=8d4f235c68e8a65df7272ec57d1d5
6ea (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 127. Members’ Club, FC BAYERN MUNICH http://www.fcbayern.t-
com.de/en/company/club/membership/index.php?fcb_sid=8d4f235c68e8a65df7272ec57d1d5
6ea (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). See also Rafael Honigstein, Bayern Munich’s New President 
Will Ensure the Club Continue as FC Uli Hoeneß, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Nov. 30, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2009/nov/30/bayern-munich-bundesliga.  
 128. Company, FC BAYERN MUNICH AG, http://www.fcbayern.t-
com.de/en/company/company/organe/index.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Members of Supervisory Board, FC BAYERN MUNICH AG, http://www.fcbayern.t-
com.de/en/company/company/organe/00287.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Company, supra note 126. 
 133. How Can Bayern Munich Pay Franck Ribery So Much?, SWISS RAMBLE (June 2, 
2010), http://swissramble.blogspot.com/2010/06/how-can-bayern-munich-pay-franck-
ribery.html. 
 134. DELOITTE, supra note 2, at 12. 
 135. Id. (noting that revenue from the Allianz Arena comprised 21% of Bayern’s 2010 
revenue). See also How Can Bayern Munich Pay Franck Ribery So Much?, supra note 133. 
 136. DELOITTE, supra note 2, at 12. 
 137. How Can Bayern Munich Pay Franck Ribery So Much?, supra note 133. As a 
point of comparison, Bayern Munich’s opponent in the 2010 Champions League Final, Inter 
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Bayern Munich serves as a good model for the AG/e.V. structure, but 
may be a model that is difficult to emulate for less successful clubs. The 
club model allows for the fans to feel invested in the club through their 
membership and express their wishes in electing management. However, the 
overall AG is somewhat insulated from any disruptions in the e.V. This 
allows for the professional football operations to be managed more 
smoothly. The club can raise capital easily through the AG structure, 
provided that the e.V. retains a controlling stake. Bayern Munich has 
provided an example of how the AG can accommodate local business 
leaders, like leaders at Audi and Adidas, who provide corporate advice as 
well as valuable connections to commercial income. The emphasis on 
increasing access to commercial revenue has the benefits of increasing 
money available for the on the field product while keeping ticket prices for 
the members relatively low. The AG structure does bring the negatives that 
any public corporation has. The management of the AG can become too 
isolated from the members of the e.V.138 Because the same people, namely 
former players, tend to be elected to positions of leadership in the club and 
the AG, there does not tend to be much exposure to different management 
viewpoints.139 Additionally, the presence of the corporate leaders on the AG 
supervisory board can lead to the club being more business driven than fan–
driven. Although Bayern Munich provides a model for a successful football 
AG, this may be case because of its leading position in German football. 
C. GmbHs 
The Bundesliga’s reforms also allowed for the club to be constituted in a 
Gesellschaft mit beschrnäkter Haftung (GmbH) provided that the club itself 
owned a majority of the GmbH.140 The GmbH is the German equivalent of 
the American limited liability company.141 As a limited liability corporation, 
the flexibility of the GmbH makes it a favored corporate form for small 
entities.142 The GmbH structure can share many of the same characteristics 
with the AG form, including the shareholder meeting, Aufsichtsrat, and 
Vorstand.143 However, the GmbH is not required to have an Aufsichtsrat if 
  
Milan, had a wage to turnover ratio of 104%. The Price of Inter’s Success, SWISS RAMBLE 
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 140. Wilkesmann & Blutner, supra note 110, at 27–28. 
 141. Drude & Oltmanns, supra note 91, at 94. 
 142. Id. 
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the articles of incorporation specify a different structure.144 The ability of 
small investors to influence the GmbH is demonstrated by the right of 
shareholders holding at least 10% of the shares to call a general meeting of 
the shareholders. 145 The GmbH is attractive to smaller entities because it 
provides a great deal of flexibility in the company’s structure but also limits 
the liability of the shareholders only to the amount of their contribution to 
the GmbH.146 Additionally, the shareholders are permitted to transfer their 
shares through sale or inheritance.147 One aspect of the GmbH that would be 
very unfavorable as a club structure in football is the provision for capital 
calls to be made on the shareholders.148 Sporting clubs are often unprofitable 
because of unrealistic dreams or unexpected failures, thus the cash call 
might be exercised on a regular basis. Although fans may voluntarily meet 
the financial requirements, they would probably not want to be required to 
do so.   
Very few clubs exist in the GmbH form. The most prominent examples 
are Bayer Leverkusen and VfL Wolfsburg.149 Bayer Leverkusen is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the chemical giant Bayer AG while VfL Wolfsburg is 
owned by Volkswagen.150 The GmbH is primarily designed for small, 
entrepreneurial companies, thus clubs are unlikely to pick this form. If a 
club is of sufficient size with enough financial resources to consider the 
GmbH form, additional complexities of the AG are probably not too great 
of a difficulty to confront. If the club is too small to be an AG, remaining as 
an e.V. is probably the wisest choice.  This dynamic probably explains the 
rarity of this form among Bundesliga clubs.  
D. KGaAs 
The third corporate form that is permitted in the Bundesliga is the 
Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien (KGaA).151 The KGaA is a form of 
partnership that combines a general partner with limited partners. 152  
Investors can become limited partners by purchasing shares that can be 
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traded on a stock exchange.153 Like the AG, the KGaA has an Aufsichtsrat 
and shareholders.154 However, the KGaA lacks a Vorstand.155 The 
management is instead entrusted to the general partner who assumes an 
unlimited personal liability for actions of the KGaA.156As a result, the 
Aufsichtsrat has no influence over appointment of the management of the 
KGaA, but does retain the supervisory function. The shareholding limited 
partners retain the rights of AG shareholders to elect the Aufsichtsrat and to 
vote on extraordinary matters, but many of the shareholders’ resolutions can 
be vetoed by the general partner.157 The KGaA form is ideal for a 
corporation wishing to retain a great deal of control while still being able to 
raise capital.158 Although the KGaA general partner retains control, the 
general partner is subject to unlimited personal liability. German law 
permits this to be mitigated through the use of an AG or a GmbH as a 
general partner.159  
The best example of the KGaA structure in the Bundesliga is BVB 
Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA.160 The club, BVB Borussia 
Dortmund e.V., follows the spirit of the 50+1 rule by maintaining control of 
the general partner, Borussia Dortmund Geschafsfuhrungs–GmbH, while 
selling shares in the KGaA. The GmbH is solely owned by the e.V.161 The 
members of BVB Borussia Dortmund e.V. elect an economic council, 
which also becomes the advisory council of the KGaA.162 The advisory 
council then appoints the managing board of the GmbH.163 As required in a 
KGaA, BVB Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA does have a 
supervisory board, but the articles of incorporation do not grant it the power 
to hire or remove the managing directors of Borussia Dortmund 
Geschaftsfuhrungs–GmbH or to restrict the directors’ decisions.164 As a 
result of this structure, the members of the e.V. ultimately direct the 
operations of the KGaA, but are several layers removed from any personal 
liability. The shareholders of the KGaA have essentially no power.  
Despite its complicated structure, the GmbH & KGaA has certain 
interesting aspects. The structure of the club is such that it grants 
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considerable autonomy to the managers of the various aspects of the 
organization. In addition, the members directly have a voice as members of 
the e.V. and as shareholders, albeit largely symbolic. The share structure 
allows for the club to raise cash through offerings of equity, provided that 
the 50+1 control is maintained. However, the KGaA stock has limited 
appeal for an investor because it grants very little power. The nature of a 
football club KGaA means that essentially only fans will be interested in 
any new share offerings by the club.165  
The same autonomy that is granted to the managers of the operations can 
prove fatal to the club if the proper managers are not chosen. BVB 
Dortmund is a prime example of this danger. BVB Dortmund initially 
issued shares in 2000 at €10 per share.166 As a result of poor financial 
planning, the club faced bankruptcy in 2005.167 New management managed 
to save the club through an outside loan and the generosity of the Dortmund 
community.168 As part of these efforts, BVB Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA 
issued approximate €50 million in new shares.169 The issuance of new 
capital and the poor history of management have driven the share price 
down to €2.60.170 However, this financial rebalancing has come at the 
expense of on the field success.171 
By any financial measure, German football clubs are the model for the 
rest of Europe. They collectively make a profit and have the highest 
attendance in the major European leagues.172 German clubs provide fans a 
voice in the governing of their clubs in a variety of unique corporate forms 
while also allowing for outside investment. The 50+1 rule plus the 
flexibility in the allowed corporate forms allows clubs to balance 
commercial interests with the interests of its members. German football 
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governance seems to be the envy of Europe, yet this appears to have come 
at the cost of European success. 
VI. ENGLISH MODELS 
Despite being the most popular league worldwide, the English Premier 
League (EPL) has faced a number of problems.  The top players that once 
joined the top EPL teams are now joining the best teams in Spain and Italy. 
Furthermore, 70% of English clubs lost money in the 2008/09 season.173 
Last year saw one of its clubs, Portsmouth, enter bankruptcy during the 
season.174   
The typical English club is constituted as a public limited company 
(PLC), which is the equivalent of the American corporation. The benefit of 
a PLC is that it is permitted to sell shares to the general public and trade 
shares on a stock exchange.175 The PLC is required to have a board of 
directors, but is only required to have two directors and a secretary.176 The 
interesting characteristics of the English football clubs is not how they are 
constituted, but how they are controlled. There are two basic categories of 
clubs. One type of club is controlled by a rich individual who acts as a 
benefactor for the club. The other type is controlled by an individual or 
group of individuals that treats the club like a normal business. 
A. The Benefactor Model 
1. Chelsea 
Chelsea F.C. is a club that has been historically unsuccessful until a 
renaissance in the last decade and a half. Since the club’s establishment in 
1905, Chelsea has played its home matches at Stamford Bridge in West 
London.177 Despite its wealthy location, Chelsea had won only one league 
title, in 1955, until its recent run of three titles in the past six years.178 
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Although Chelsea fans are among England’s richest, Chelsea has 
continually had financial difficulties. The blame for this financial hardship 
can be blamed both on the mediocre on the field results and on the costs 
incurred in renovating Stamford Bridge. During one financial crisis, the 
club devised a scheme to thwart the efforts of a developer eager to exploit 
the valuable property. A nonprofit group, Chelsea Pitch Owners, P.L.C., 
was created to own the property on which Stamford Bridge sits.179 The 
group is constituted in a manner that caps the voting rights of individual 
shareholders in order to prevent a takeover.180 The club also transferred 
ownership of the name Chelsea F.C. to Chelsea Pitch Owners, P.L.C. to 
exercise a check upon later owners wishing to move the club elsewhere.181  
During the 1990s, Chelsea followed the trend of modernizing English stadia 
with its Chelsea Village project.182 The Chelsea Village project included a 
hotel and shopping complex that were not as successful as originally 
planned.183 Ultimately, the debts incurred during redevelopment financially 
crippled the club and later led to its sale.184  
Chelsea’s history of financial woes came to an abrupt end in June 2003. 
As the club prepared to enter bankruptcy, the Russian oil magnate Roman 
Abramovich purchased the assets of the club for £60 million and assumed 
the club’s £80 million in debt.185 Abramovich has embarked on a 
remarkable spending spree since assuming control. He is estimated to have 
spent well over £500 million on the acquisition of players.186 As a result of 
his lavish spending, Chelsea has recorded financial losses every year during 
his ownership.187 Despite a pledge to balance the books by 2010, Chelsea 
still incurred a £71 million loss on revenue of £209.5 million in 2010.188 
This actually been an improvement on a record loss of £140 million in 
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2005.189 Further prudence is shown in the cost cutting that has led to a wage 
to revenue ratio of 73%.190 Abramovich has funded these lavish 
expenditures through £726 million in interest free loans to the club.191 The 
looming Fair Play Rules have made this debt extremely unfavorable to 
maintain on the balance sheet, thus Abramovich has recently converted the 
loans into equity.192 As a result of Abramovich’s vast injections of capital 
into Chelsea, the club has enjoyed by far its most successful period in its 
history. 
2. Manchester City 
Manchester City FC has a reputation as an unlucky club that continually 
languished in the shadow of its more successful neighbor, Manchester 
United. Manchester City was founded in 1880 and had its most successful 
period during the 1960s and 1970s.193 However, since its heyday in the 
1970s, Manchester City has failed to win a single trophy and has been 
relegated.194 The club lived on a relatively modest income until it was 
acquired for £81.6 million in June 2007 by the former Prime Minister of 
Thailand Thaksin Shinawatra.195 Shinawatra had been exiled from Thailand 
in 2006 as the result of a coup.196 Because he wished to return from exile, he 
wanted a way to generate positive publicity in Thailand. Despite having an 
estimated £800 million in assets frozen by the coup leaders because of 
allegations of fraud and corruption,  Shinawatra managed to purchase 
Manchester City as well as fund player purchases in the short term. 197 
Eventually his problems in Thailand caught up with him. Shinawatra did not 
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have sufficient free cash to continue to fund the club. At the same time, the 
Thai authorities issued warrants for his arrests.198 The legal actions 
prompted the Premier League to consider declaring him an unfit and 
improper owner.199 With problems mounting, Shinawatra sold the club to 
the Abu Dhabi United Group.200 
The Abu Dhabi United Group has generated a great deal of controversy 
in its short term of ownership, but this controversy has generally centered 
around the vast sums of money spent by the owners. The Abu Dhabi United 
Group is headed by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan.201 The backing 
of a prominent member of the Abu Dhabi royal family meant that 
considerable money was and is available for the club. Sheikh Mansour 
originally appointed Dr. Sulaiman Al–Fahim to be his agent for the 
takeover.202 After Al–Fahim made outlandish and controversial statements 
about the resources now available to the club, Al Fahim was removed and a 
more reserved chairman was appointed.203 In the two years since Sheikh 
Mansour’s takeover, Manchester City has spent an astounding £300 million 
on player acquisitions.204 This lavish spending has had predictable effects 
upon the financial statements. Manchester City followed a loss of £92.6 
million in 2009 with a £121 million loss in 2010.205 The wage to revenue 
ratio has alarmingly increased from 95% in 2009 to 107% in 2010.206 These 
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are certainly not acceptable under the Fair Play Rules. Sheikh Mansour has 
directly financed £400 million of these expenditures through equity 
offerings as well as shareholder loans that are later converted to equity.207  
Despite the lavish spending, Manchester City has still failed to finish in the 
fourth place spot in the EPL necessary to qualify for the Champions League.  
3. Blackburn Rovers 
Although Roman Abramovich was the first foreign benefactor in the 
EPL, the model did not originate with him. Rich men have always funded 
their local clubs as a type of community service, but the scale seen in the 
last twenty years is completely new. Despite the benefits of a benefactor, 
there are dangers associated with it. One of the best examples of the 
negatives of the benefactor model is Blackburn Rovers F.C. The Blackburn 
Rovers were acquired in the early 1990s by the steel magnate Jack 
Walker.208 Under Walker, Blackburn spent £25 million in the transfer 
market during the early 1990s, including two British record signings.209 The 
spending culminated in the 1994–95 Premier League title.210 Walker died in 
2000, but provided for the club in his will.211 For a decade, the club was 
managed by the Jack Walker Trust.212 The trustees ended up writing off 
£100 million in loans made by Walker and the trust as well as loaning a 
further £5 million to the club. 213The trustees put the club up for sale in 
2007, but it took until November 2010 to find a buyer.214 Due to a lack of 
certainty as to the future of the club as well as the limited ability of the trust 
to fund the club, the club has lacked a clear direction since Walker’s death. 
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4. Benefactor Model Analysis 
As Chelsea, Manchester City, and Blackburn have demonstrated, the 
benefactor model has positives and negatives. The benefactor can directly 
inject cash into the club to acquire new and better players.215 Because the 
benefactor holds all the control in the club, the benefactor can make quick 
decisions for the club without needing to gain the approval of others. 
However, the strengths of the benefactor model are also its great weakness. 
Because all of the power rests in one person, the fans can feel marginalized. 
The benefactor can alleviate most but not all of this feeling through success 
on the field. The benefactor may be forced to make decisions that are best 
for the financial health of the club at the expense of the sense of community 
that the fans have.216 In the benefactor model, fans have very few concrete 
ways of expressing their views on the direction of the club other than at the 
game.217  
The total influence of the benefactor over club affairs can be dangerous. 
Although the benefactors are typically extremely successful businessmen, 
sports are a unique type of business. Success in the business world does not 
necessarily translate into on the field success.218  Failing to take the advice 
of individuals experienced in football team building can lead to on the field 
failure. Additionally, the influence of the owner can taint the image of the 
club. Roman Abramovich gained his immense fortune in 1990s Russia by 
means that could be considered illegal today. Abramovich’s negative 
reputation has led to rival fans calling Chelsea “Chelski.” A similar type of 
venom may be targeted at Manchester City because of its Emirati 
ownership.  
The presence of a single man in charge can lead to chaos when that one 
man becomes incapacitated. This phenomenon can be also observed in 
politics and in other types of business. Sophisticated businessmen like the 
benefactors mentioned above obviously have estate planning mechanisms in 
place of such an eventuality. However, the example of Blackburn shows 
that when the one man in charge is no longer in charge, there is a leadership 
void that ensues. That void may be filled by the relatives of the benefactor, 
but there is no guarantee that these relatives will be as vested in the club’s 
success as the benefactor. That void may linger for quite a long time and 
lead to stagnation if the club is unlucky. The power collected in a single 
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benefactor ultimately has the potential to shape the club in a positive or 
negative manner. 
B. The Normal Business Owner Model 
The other model of English clubs is what I have termed the normal 
business owner model. The normal business owner model is a company that 
is run, or is intended to be run, like a sustainable business. This can take a 
number forms depending upon the ownership. The club may be owned by a 
single individual or group of individuals. In many ways, this can resemble 
the benefactor model, but the business owner model generally features more 
restrained spending.   
1. Manchester United 
Manchester United has dominated English football for the past two 
decades. Since the Premier League was formed in 1992, Manchester United 
has won eleven league titles as well as two Champions League trophies.219 
This remarkable run of success has come under the direction of manager Sir 
Alex Ferguson who has been in charge of Manchester United since 1986.220 
Manchester United had a humble beginning in 1878 as a club founded by 
railway workers in the Newton Heath area of Greater Manchester.221 Only 
when the club joined the professional Football League in 1892 was the club 
incorporated.222 The incorporating members took this step to limit their 
liability rather than to obtain equity for later sale. For many years, shares 
were of negligible monetary value. The club periodically issued shares to its 
fans when it faced financial hardships, but the shares entitled the 
shareholders only to minor perks like a season ticket.223  
In the 1950s, Louis Edwards became involved in Manchester United. At 
first he held only a few shares, but when his company began trading on the 
stock exchange, Louis Edwards began a quest to buy Manchester United 
shares.224 By 1964, Edwards had obtained 2,223 shares, giving him 54% 
control of the club.225 Later purchases in the 1970s took the Edwards 
shareholding up to 74%.226 Up until the early 1980s, the English Football 
Association had maintained regulations that forbade paying club directors 
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and restricted the dividends that could be paid.227 Because of the five pence 
per share restriction on dividends, Louis Edwards created a right for each 
shareholder to buy 208 new shares for each existing £1 share that the 
shareholder owned.228 As a result, there were 209 times as many shares to 
pay out the five pence dividend. By evading the restrictions, Louis Edwards 
was able to dramatically increase the amount of money paid out of the club 
in dividends.229 Sensing that the club could command a large amount of 
money, Louis Edwards attempted to sell the club to a number of 
individuals.230 After those plans fell through, Louis Edwards created a 
holding company for Manchester United and traded shares in the holding 
company on the London Stock Exchange.231 Louis’s son Martin Edwards 
gradually sold the family’s entire holding in the club, making a profit of 
approximately £88 million on the initial £800,000 investment.232  
Manchester United’s time on the London Stock Exchange was an 
interesting period. In 1998, Rupert Murdoch launched a £625 million 
takeover bid that was thwarted by the UK government on competition 
reasons.233 Following the failure of the Murdoch bid, the Irish investors John 
Magnier and J.P. McManus built up a significant stake in the club by the 
end of 2001.234 In March 2003, the American Malcolm Glazer announced 
that he had acquired a small stake in the club.235 By October 2004, Glazer 
had raised his stake to 28.11%.236 After Glazer acquired Magnier and 
McManus’s 28.7% shareholding, Glazer continued to acquire shares until he 
owned the entire club.237  
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The Glazer acquisition was very costly and controversial. The entire cost 
of acquisition was approximately £831 million.238 The most controversial 
part of the takeover was that Glazer transferred loans amounting to £559 
million of the acquisition cost to the club.239 The debt was both in bank 
loans as well as “payment in kind” loans, which carried an initial interest 
rate of 14.25%.240 Unlike a normal loan where interest is repaid regularly, 
the high interest rate on the “payment in kind” loans continue to accumulate 
until the time of repayment.241 As a result, Manchester United went from a 
financially successful club to one that was heavily laden with debt.    
This heavy debt load is very unpopular with fans who believe that the 
Glazers have diverted the club’s revenue to paying the interest on the debt. 
The fans worry that the Glazers have not invested sufficient resources in 
players to win trophies as a result of interest payments on the debt. Because 
fans have lost their voice in the boardroom, they have organized a number 
of protests. Just after the takeover, a group of fans formed a new club called 
FC United of Manchester. In 2010, another round of protests began under 
the title of Green and Gold.242 An offshoot of this movement, calling 
themselves the Red Knights, prepared a £1 billion offer for the club.243 
Ultimately, the Glazer family has stood firm and has steadfastly ignored the 
protests about their ownership.  
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Despite strong revenue generation, Manchester United faces an uncertain 
future. A substantial portion of the club’s revenue is allocated to servicing 
the acquisition debt. At some point the debt may grow to a point where it 
cannot be financed any further. Alternatively, the club may fail to reach the 
Champions League, thus depriving the club of a substantial amount of 
revenue needed to service the debt. The fate of Manchester United rests, as 
it has for two decades, on manager Sir Alex Ferguson’s ability to generate a 
winning product on the field. Sir Alex is now in his late sixties and expects 
to retire within the next few years. The debt has placed an immense pressure 
on him and his future successor to continue to deliver consistent revenue 
growth on minimal reinvestment. Ultimately, the Glazer acquisition 
resolved some short term uncertainty in ownership but has posed new, 
longer term questions about the financial viability of the club.  
2. Liverpool 
Liverpool is one of the most famous clubs in world football. The club 
has won five European cups, more than any other English team.244 Although 
Liverpool dominated the 1970s and 1980s, it has failed to win a league title 
since 1990. Despite the recent failings, the memory of Liverpool’s greatness 
remains and gives the club considerable worldwide marketing potential.  
Liverpool was founded in 1892 by the owner of its stadium, Anfield, to 
utilize the vacant stadium after the departure of Everton F.C., Liverpool’s 
other major club.245 For most of the past half century, the club was under the 
control of the Moores family.246 In the mid–2000s, the majority shareholder 
David Moores decided that he could not compete in the changing climate in 
football as evidenced by Roman Abramovich’s acquisition of Chelsea. 
Moores entertained a number of bids, including bids from Thaksin 
Shinawatra and Dubai Investment Capital, before deciding to sell to 
Americans Tom Hicks and George Gillett.247 
The Hicks and Gillett group paid £218 million for the club and took out 
£350 million in loans to fund the acquisition as well as the planning phases 
of a new stadium.248 Despite initially claiming that their takeover was not 
like the Glazer takeover of Manchester United, Hicks and Gillett managed 
to transfer about half of the debt to the club.249 As at Manchester United, 
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this action did not endear Hicks and Gillett to the Liverpool fans. Hicks and 
Gillett also were unfortunate in the timing of their takeover of the club. A 
centerpiece of their business plan was to build a new stadium. When the 
acquisition was completed, Hicks and Gillett decided to revise the existing 
plans.250 By the time the plans were revised, the credit crisis made obtaining 
a loan to build a new stadium virtually impossible.251 Due in part to the 
financial pressures from the loan repayment, Hicks and Gillett developed a 
great deal of animosity toward each other and toward manager Rafael 
Benitez.252 Adding to the soap opera between Hicks and Gillett and Benitez 
was an incident where Hicks’s son sent a derogatory email to a fan and was 
forced to resign from his club position.253 The many controversies and 
perceived lack of investment in the club made Hicks and Gillett very 
unpopular with the fans. 
The financing structure of the takeover deal ultimately proved to be the 
undoing of Hicks and Gillett. A large portion of the debt was due in April 
2010.254 The holder of the debt, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), granted 
Hicks and Gillett a six month extension in an effort to find a buyer for the 
club.255 However, RBS instituted a number of conditions for this extension. 
Among these conditions were that Martin Broughton, chairman of British 
Airways, was to be made chairman of the holding company.256 RBS also 
required that Liverpool’s articles of association be amended to grant the 
chairman the exclusive right to appoint or remove directors.257 Broughton 
was given the task of finding a buyer that would serve the best interests of 
the club.258 The sale was complicated not only by conflicts between the 
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owners and the manger, but also by Liverpool’s failure to qualify for the 
2010/11 Champions League. 
As the October deadline approached, a bid from New England Sports 
Ventures (NESV) emerged.259 The bid proposed repaying the RBS loan, but 
left no money for the shares of Hicks and Gillett or the loans to the holding 
company made by Hicks and Gillett.260 Hicks and Gillett were not pleased 
with the bid and attempted to replace two of the five directors of the club’s 
holding company with Hicks appointees.261 Broughton then launched a legal 
action to prevent Hicks and Gillett from blocking the sale to NESV.262 The 
English High Court granted Broughton’s request for an injunction.263 Before 
the sale could proceed, Hicks obtained a temporary restraining order from a 
Texas court to block the sale.264 Broughton responded by obtaining an order 
from the English High Court preventing the enforcement of the Texas 
injunction.265 Eventually, the sale was completed before the RBS 
deadline.266 The new owners at NESV have refrained from any public 
relations disasters in the short time they have owned the club, but so far 
have not given much indication as to future actions. 
3. Arsenal 
Although the club has not won anything in five seasons, Arsenal F.C. 
remains one of the most successful clubs in English football history and one 
of the most famous names in world football. Arsenal originated as a club of 
workers at the Woolwich Arsenal in Southeast London.267 The club later 
incorporated to limit the liability of the members. The club struggled 
financially in Southeast London, but came under the influence of Sir Henry 
Norris in the years leading up to World War I.268 Sir Henry moved the club 
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to the Highbury area of North London, where the club has remained every 
since.269 After Sir Henry left the club, Sir Samuel Hill–Wood gained control 
of the club.270 For much of the past eighty years, the Hill–Wood family, 
including Peter Hill–Wood, the current chairman, has controlled the club.271 
Around the same time that Louis Edwards began extracting money from 
Manchester United, a trader named David Dein purchased 16% of Arsenal 
for £292,000.272 Dein later increased his shareholding dramatically, but sold 
a substantial portion of his shares to diamond trader Danny Fiszman 
throughout the 1990s.273 Although he was only vice–chairman of the club, 
Dein had considerable influence over football matters, including the 
responsibility for hiring manager Arsene Wenger.274 Since hiring Wenger in 
1996, Arsenal has won three English Premier League titles and four FA 
Cups. Because the nature of Arsenal’s stadium constrained further 
development, plans were made to move the club to a modern stadium which 
could generate much more revenue. Dein was initially not a supporter of the 
move, but Fiszman pushed the idea through.275 The costs of the stadium 
project amounted to approximately £390 million.276 The project was 
financed with a combination of £260 million of debt and cash from naming 
rights, equity offerings, and an advance on commercial revenues.277  
Although the stadium has resulted in a tremendous increase in revenue, the 
debt restricted the ability of the club to invest in players until a large amount 
of the property associated with the project was sold.278 
The financial restrictions imposed by the stadium as well as the 
emergence of Abramovich’s Chelsea led to a fracture in the ownership 
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group. Dein believed that the club needed a billionaire benefactor for 
Arsenal to achieve the success it desired. Dein took steps toward that goal 
by introducing American billionaire Stan Kroenke to the club through the 
sale of a 10% stake in the club owned by ITV.279 The Arsenal board was not 
pleased by the suggestion and forced Dein to resign from his vice–chairman 
position.280 Chairman Peter Hill–Wood went so far as to say that he didn’t 
want Kroenke’s sort at the club.281 Dein subsequent sold his 14.58% stake in 
the club to Uzbek billionaire Alisher Usmanov.282  Faced with the threat of 
a takeover by Usmanov, the Arsenal board subsequently decided that 
Kroenke was the sort that they wanted at the club and made him a board 
member. In an effort to counter a takeover, the board entered into a 
lockdown agreement that prevented the board members from selling their 
shares to a nonapproved person until October 2010.283 In the midst of the 
controversy, the Arsenal board also forced out Nina Bracewell–Smith, who 
holds 15.9% of the shares.284 As of November 2010, Arsenal’s ownership 
seems to have reached some measure of stability, with Usmanov owning 
27% and Kroenke owning 29.9%.285 
The controversy regarding the ownership of Arsenal greatly concerned 
many fans. Although Arsenal, through its holding company Arsenal 
Holdings, PLC, is quoted on the PLUS exchange,286 shares trade currently 
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trade in excess of £10,000.287 The price of the Arsenal share is far outside 
the reach of most fans, but Arsenal has begun an initiative called the 
Arsenal Fanshare.288 The Fanshare is a plan that allows fans to make 
monthly contributions to a pool of money that will buy shares when they 
become available.289 If a fan contributes at least 1% of the cost of a share, 
the fan will be able to vote as a shareholder and attend the shareholder 
meeting.290 Although the impact of this initiative will be small in view of the 
considerable obstacles to blocking a takeover, it is a step toward making 
Arsenal fans more involved in the decision–making at the club. 
Although Arsenal has experienced mixed results on the field, the 
financial situation is excellent. Arsenal recorded a £56 million profit while 
reducing the net debt by £154 million in the 2010 annual report.291  The 
future is not quite as promising as it may appear at first glance. Manager 
Arsene Wenger has been responsible for a large part of the impressive 
performance by finding great value in players, but when Wenger eventually 
leaves Arsenal, there is no guarantee that his successor will be able to keep 
it up. Despite Usmanov’s announcement that he plans to raise his stake to 
just under 30%,292  the cold war between Kroenke and Usmanov could 
become hot at any moment. There is also the potential that a takeover bid 
could be launched by Kroenke or Usmanov or from unknown third party. 
The danger is that such a takeover bid would likely be financed by debt and 
thus lead to a Manchester United or Liverpool situation. Arsenal’s 
ownership appears precariously balanced for the time being.  
4. Normal Business Owner Model Analysis 
As the examples of Manchester United, Liverpool, and Arsenal show, the 
business owner model has advantages and disadvantages. The primary 
advantage of a PLC is the easy ability to raise capital. In a situation like 
Arsenal or Manchester United before the Glazer takeover, the ability to own 
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shares in the club allows for fans to play at least a minor role in club 
decisions. The lack of a benefactor guaranteeing losses necessitates that the 
club break even every year. Only with the introduction of the Fair Play 
Rules has this become a benefit. Additionally, the absence of a benefactor 
drives the owners of the club to maximize all available revenue sources. 
This added revenue then can be expended upon players and facilities.   
As Manchester United and Liverpool have demonstrated, the business 
owner model has a number of great flaws. The ability of a club to trade on 
the stock exchange makes it vulnerable to attempts to take over the club 
because of a limited ability for fans to block the action. The more alarming 
aspect of the takeovers is the acquisition debt that owners place upon the 
clubs. This crushing debt diverts money from the on the field expenditures 
to interest repayment. As Arsenal and Liverpool have shown, the presence 
of multiple owners has a potential to create a great deal of problems for the 
club. At Liverpool, the owners were at war with themselves, the manager, 
and the fans. As a result, the club was thrown into chaos and was a 
contributing factor to the club’s failure to qualify for the 2010/11 
Champions League. The Arsenal crisis was confined to the boardroom, but 
this was probably due only to the great influence of Arsene Wenger over the 
club. The lack of one clear decision–maker often creates a void of 
leadership that can cripple a club. Although the business owner model often 
gives the fan some amount of involvement in the club, the fan involvement 
has been almost nonexistent in practice. When the fan feels excluded from 
the club and sees that large sums of money are diverted to interest 
payments, dividends, or club bank accounts, the fan can feel quite unhappy 
with the state of the club. 
VI. WHAT MODEL IS BEST? 
A number of models for ownership of a football club have been 
explained above: the socio model of Spain, the variety of mixed models in 
Germany, and the benefactor and business owner PLC models of England. 
The variety of corporate forms has grown out of the cultural differences in 
the business and sports of each nation. It is important to note that every 
corporate model can meet UEFA’s Financial Fair Play Regulations with 
competent managers and realistic on the field expectations.  
As Europe becomes more integrated, a unified model may be appropriate 
for UEFA to create a level playing field for clubs competing in UEFA 
competitions. This UEFA model needs to balance the desire of the club’s 
fans to influence club decisions about buying and selling players and 
choosing managers with the commercial realities of the modern club. 
Aspects of an ideal form can be derived from examining the structures 
currently in place. The socio model provides for heavy involvement of the 
fans in club decisions, but is not a great model commercially or financially 
because equity cannot be sold and management can get distracted in club 
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politics. The PLC model run by a benefactor provides excellent resources 
and central direction but leaves fans on the outside. The normal business 
owner PLC model can allow for fans to gain some voice in club decisions 
but is very vulnerable to a leveraged buyout. The KGaA model provides 
fans a small voice, but grants its managers too much leeway while 
neglecting shareholders. The AG model combines a measure of fan 
involvement with the ability to raise equity and effectively manage the 
business operations of the club. 
The UEFA model club should adopt the features of the German AG. The 
fans have control of the underlying club while also allowing for equity 
investment. The dual board structure characteristic of German AGs allows 
for much active corporate governance than the single board that exists in 
PLCs and clubs like Barcelona and Real Madrid. As Bayern Munich 
demonstrates, the AG best attempts to balance the desire for fan 
involvement with the commercial and financial realities of the competitive 
club. 
The implementation of the model club structure would be extremely 
difficult. The process of convincing clubs to adopt this type of structure 
while remaining within European Union law would be difficult. Although 
the AG structure might be best for the club, club owners have their own 
interests to protect. For instance, the Glazer family will never give control 
of the Manchester United to the fans when they have such a valuable asset 
and so much debt. For clubs like Barcelona and Real Madrid, the possibility 
of a conversion is not quite so remote. Because these types of clubs have no 
single owner, a change in structure would not be so financially painful, but 
very culturally painful.   
Any UEFA regulation must also comply with European Union law, 
therefore any UEFA rule must be carefully drafted. Any move to enforce a 
model club structure would most likely violate European Union law. The 
implementation efforts would first require the European Union to grant a 
general sporting exemption in European Union law or, at the very least, an 
ad hoc exemption. Despite football’s unique place in European culture, the 
European Union refuses to accept UEFA’s advocacy for an exemption and 
likely will continue to do so in the future.293 Although UEFA may argue that 
this is the best way to balance fan interest and commercial realities, the 
European Union is extremely unlikely to agree to implement a plan that 
effectively deprives many owners of a multi–million Euro asset.  
  
 293. The European Union has considered this issue, but has chosen to reject any 
further steps at this time. See, e.g., Commission Communication, supra note 17, at 12. 
However, there continue to be investigations into these areas. See Commissioner Vassilieu, 
supra note 13.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
As the financial crisis in football worsens, the Financial Fair Play Rules 
have provided a basis to consider what types of football club structures 
might be preferable for a financially sustainable club. Although it may be 
practically impossible to force significant changes without governmental 
involvement, adopting a German style model is the preferable option. The 
German model provides the optimum amount of fan involvement in club 
affairs while providing the benefits of centralized control. Despite different 
club structures, a financially sustainable club is possible with the right 
leadership and realistic expectations. Revenue in football has saturated the 
European market and the tantalizing North American and Asian markets 
may never by fully exploited by clubs. It is important that clubs exercise 
sufficient discipline to ensure that the club exists for the fans of the future.  
 
